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Vagrants in Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traffic Stops
and Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois
By Timothy P. O'Neill*

INTRODUCTION

Six months after the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, a South
Carolina plantation owner named Edmund Rhett was named to a state
commission to draft new laws reflecting the end of slavery. In a letter
written in October 1865, he laid out his goal: the Negro "should be kept
as near to the condition of slavery as possible, and as far from the
condition of the white man as is practicable." 1 To this end, he
recommended that the legislature pass a stringent law against Negro
vagrancy. Rhett noted that the "object of this Law would be to give
fixedness to [the black] population and to prevent their eternal
wanderings and floating about the state from one point to another, lazy,
2
lawless, thieving and vagrandizing."
South Carolina was not alone. Within a year after the end of the
Civil War, almost every former Confederate state passed sweeping
vagrancy laws allowing for the arrest of any man who did not have a
labor contract. 3 Enforcement of these laws disproportionately targeted
freed slaves and was designed to keep them from leaving their former
masters' plantations. 4 Southern cities also passed vagrancy ordinances
5
that punished violators by sending them to workhouses or street crews.

* Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I wish to acknowledge the excellent research

assistance of Laura Howard, J.D.
1. STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, THE BLOODY SHIRT: TERROR AFTER APPOMATrOX 24 (2008).

2. Id. at 25.
3.

Alexander Tsesis,

Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth

Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REv. 307, 383 (2004) (stating that the only exceptions at that time were
Tennessee and Arkansas).
4. Id. at 383-84.
5. Id. at 383. For instance, the mayor of Mobile, Alabama warned vagrants that "if they did
not find employment or leave the city they would be arrested and forced to work on public
streets." Id.
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These state and local laws as applied essentially criminalized
unemployment among former slaves.
Vagrancy laws were nothing new. The breakup of feudal estates in
fourteenth-century England spawned several legal measures aimed at
alleviating the resulting shortage of farm workers. The purpose of such
laws was to restrict the movement of workers away from their former
estates. 6 When curtailing the geographical mobility of laborers was no
longer necessary, however, the laws did not disappear. Rather, they
evolved into devices to control the English poor 7 by criminalizing not
8
only a "refusal to labor" but "begging" as well.
The English vagrancy laws paralleled those in effect in the
antebellum South. 9 Versions of these laws remained on the books for
more than a century, until the United States Supreme Court confronted
10
them head-on in cases such as Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville.
In Papachristou, a Jacksonville, Florida vagrancy ordinance made it a
11
criminal offense for people to be, inter alia, "rogues and vagabonds."'
The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as being "void for
vagueness" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not
only because the law failed to provide the public with fair notice of
what conduct violated the law, but also because it endowed the police

6. William J. Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of the Laws of Vagrancy, in SOCIAL
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND SOCIETY 87, 87-90 (2004) (noting that by the middle of the fourteenth
century, the availability of an adequate supply of cheap labor diminished significantly due to the
Black Death). Additionally, in order to fund the Crusades and various other wars, landowners
sold the serfs their freedom and industrialized towns could offer a higher standard of living to
freed serfs. Id. The development of anti-migratory vagrancy laws served to "curtail mobility of
laborers in such a way that labor would not become a commodity for which the landowners
would have to compete." Id.
7. Id. at 90 (indicating that the substance of the vagrancy laws did not change from their first
appearance in 1349 except for a tendency to increase punishments.). For instance, a 1360 law
punished the offender with imprisonment for fifteen days while a 1388 law placed the violator in
the stockade until such time that "he find surety to return to his service." Id.
8. Id. at 95.
9. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, "The Power to Govern Men and Things": Patriarchal
Origins of the Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1277, 1287-88 (citing ARTHUR
P. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 273-74 (1930)). In 1672, the Virginia
Assembly ordered that English vagrancy laws be strictly enforced. Id. This included the
whipping of vagrants and their incarceration in a house of correction until either employment was
found for them or they were banished. Id.
10. 405 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1972) (holding that the ordinance at issue criminalized activities
that are innocent by modern standards, including "nightwalking").
11. Id. at 156 n. 1. Based on the arrestees in the case, "rogues and vagabonds" may often have
simply been black men found in the company of white women. See id. at 158-59 (two of the
defendants in the series of consolidated cases were white females who were charged with
"prowling by auto" on an early Sunday morning when they were found driving on a main
thoroughfare in Jacksonville on their way to a nightclub with two black males in the automobile).
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with authority to make arbitrary arrests. 12 This decision supposedly
ended the arbitrary police use of vagrancy laws in America to harass
poor, disenfranchised citizens.
Yet there is a question of whether things really have changed for
minorities, particularly with regard to the enforcement of motor vehicle
laws. On the national level, a large body of legal literature exists on the
"driving while black" phenomenon. 13 Locally, Chicagoans recently
faced front-page headlines trumpeting a new study illustrating
14
disturbing racial disparities in traffic enforcement throughout Illinois.
One aspect of this study dealt with the number of traffic stops that
resulted in the driver's consent to a search of the vehicle. The results
are stunning. In 2007, police agencies throughout Illinois utilized
consent searches against Hispanic drivers more than twice as often as
against Caucasian drivers, and consent searches against black drivers
were utilized three times as often as against Caucasian drivers. 15 Yet,
twice as likely to
and equally troubling, the searches of Caucasians were 16
minorities.
of
searches
the
were
as
discover contraband
In Illinois, minority drivers could truly be called "vagrants in
Volvos." Officially, the vagrancy laws that were once used by law
enforcement to restrict the travel of minorities have been abolished.
12. Id. at 165-71.
13. See e.g., David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Courtand Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 544-46 (1997)
(arguing that following the United States Supreme Court decision in Whren v. United States,
African-Americans should expect a greater number of "driving while black" pretextual stops);
Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 721 (1999) (following the Supreme Court's decision in
Whren v. United States, "evidence that Blackness has become an acceptable 'risk factor' for
criminal behavior" has become increasingly more mainstream in determining the correlation
between race and interactions with law enforcement); Jennifer Larrabee, "DWB" and Equal
Protection: The Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291, 294-95
(stating that while the Supreme Court analyzed pretextual race-based traffic stops under the
Fourth Amendment in Whren v. United States, it should have addressed the constitutionality of
the practice under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while relaxing the
claimant's burden of showing that the police intended to discriminate); Adero S. Jernigan,
Driving While Black: Racial Profiling in America, 24 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 127, 136-37 (2000)
(positing that unless the holding in Whren v. United States is overturned or state legislation
provides more protection for minority motorists, the crime of "driving while black" will continue
to exist and minority citizens will not "have the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures").
14. Monique Garcia & Ray Long, Study Sees Racial Bias in Traffic-Stop Searches, CHI. TRiB.,
July 25, 2008, at 1.
15. Id.
16. See id. The study was conducted by the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety,
relying on information gathered by the Illinois Department of Transportation from police officers'
own reports. Id.
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However, strict enforcement of the traffic code against minority drivers
and passengers simply amounts to a different means being used to
achieve the same end.
Clearly, Illinois has a problem. Yet ironically, over the past decade
Illinois courts have actually moved backwards in dealing with the issue
of racial bias in traffic stops. This is because the Illinois Supreme Court
has overruled a quintet of cases it decided in 2002 and 2003 that
restricted the power of Illinois police during traffic stops. 17 Moreover,
through the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of the "limited
lockstep" 18 principle in the area of search and seizure law, it has
promised it will almost never require more from police than the bare
minimum national standard mandated by the United States Supreme
Court. 19

This Article makes several contentions. First, because the Illinois
Supreme Court has refused to address the serious problems Illinois
faces in the area of race and traffic stops, seeking judicial relief is futile.
Consequently, this Article contends that the only solution lies with
Illinois' legislative and executive branches.
Interestingly, some
possible reforms emanate from the very doctrines the Illinois Supreme
Court so unwisely recently discarded.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I traces the last six years
of Illinois Supreme Court cases in the area of race and traffic stops. It
looks at five cases decided in 2002 and 2003 that established
sophisticated, nuanced solutions to the problems of police using minor
traffic stops as a pretext to search minorities for drugs and weapons. It
then critiques the court's needless overruling of these doctrines during
the last few years. Part II describes a hypothetical police officer in
Illinois. Using the current state of the law, it illustrates the enormous
power police officers now have to turn traffic stops for trivial offenses
into opportunities for extensive-and suspicionless-searches of
persons and vehicles. Part III analyzes a real case decided by the
Illinois Appellate Court in 2007: People v. Andres Roa.20 This case
involved what appeared to be an ordinary stop for speeding that
eventually resulted in a consent search recovering contraband.2 1 Part III
examines the lessons that the Roa case, particularly the dissent, offers
17. See infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
18. The limited lockstep doctrine applies when a provision in the Illinois Constitution is
identical or "synonymous" with a provision in the Federal Constitution and should thus be
interpreted in the same manner. People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 31-32 (111. 2006).
19. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
20. 879 N.E.2d 366 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), vacated and remanded, 896 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 2008).
21. Id. at 367-69.
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for reforming traffic stops in Illinois. Part IV then posits suggestions
for remedies. Since the Illinois Supreme Court has abdicated all
responsibility in this area, this Article focuses on solutions that can
come from both the Illinois legislative and executive branches.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF CURBING PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOPS AND
CONSENSUAL VEHICLE SEARCHES IN THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT FROM
2002 THROUGH 2008

During 2002 and 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down an
important set of five cases that extended significant new protections to
drivers and passengers of automobiles who were stopped by the police.
This Part will analyze these cases and then trace the Illinois Supreme
Court's recent and unwise abandonment of the doctrines these cases
created.
A. 2002-2003: The Illinois Supreme Court Extends State
ConstitutionalProtectionsto Curb PretextualTraffic Stops and
Consensual Vehicle Searches
From 2002 through 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court decided five
cases curbing the power of the police during traffic stops: People v.
Cox, People v. Gonzalez, People v. Bunch, People v. Caballes, and
People v. Harris.2 2 These five cases were in many ways a response to
the United States Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Whren v. United
States.23 In Whren, the Court unanimously held that a police officer's
subjective reasons-even if they were blatantly racist-for making a
traffic stop were irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. 24 The only
is whether a
relevant consideration under a Fourth Amendment analysis
25
stop.
a
such
made
have
could
police officer objectively
This holding flatly contradicted existing policy in Illinois. Before
Whren, Illinois courts examined whether an ostensibly proper traffic
stop was merely a pretext for a stop based on illegal racial
considerations. 26 However, after Whren, Illinois courts began to
2002), overruled by People v. Bew, 886 N.E.2d 1002
22. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill.
(Ill. 2008); People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 2003), overruled by People v. Harris, 886
N.E.2d 947 (111.2008); People v. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d 1024 (111.2003); People v. Caballes, 802
N.E.2d 202 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); People v. Harris, 802 N.E.2d 219 (11.
2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005).
23. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
24. Id. at 813 ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.").
25.

Id. at 819.

26. See, e.g., People v. Guerieri, 551 N.E.2d 768, 770 (111.App. Ct. 1990) ("In determining
whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable

750
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approve traffic stops based on a variety of minor offenses. 27 Subjective
police motive in making a stop became irrelevant. As long as the stop
was based on some objective-albeit trivial-offense, even a racially
improper motive was simply immaterial.
These minor offenses became the legal "foot in the door" for police
officers to ask questions, use drug-sniffing dogs, or ask consent to

search.

Once this door was forced open, civil libertarians became

concerned because the drivers who were stopped-not only in Illinois
but throughout the entire country-were disproportionately members of
minority groups. 28 Recognizing this phenomenon, some state courts
sought to increase driver and passenger rights to a level exceeding the
29
Federal Constitutional threshold.
This was the impetus for the Illinois Supreme Court to establish

important protections for drivers and passengers in five traffic stop
cases from 2002 to 2003: People v. Cox, 30 People v. Gonzalez, 3 1 People
34
v. Bunch, 32 People v. Caballes,33 and People v. Harris.
The facts of these cases suggest that minorities were being singled

out for traffic stops for trivial offenses. The stops were based on such
offenses as a lack of a rear license plate light, 35 driving 71 mph in a 65officer would have made the seizure in the absence of an illegitimate motive." (citing United
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11 th Cir. 1986)); Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n,
224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining "pretext" as a "dishonest explanation, a lie rather than
an oddity or an error" (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147
(2000))).
27. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Using 'Terry' To Show Traffic Stop Was Pretext, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Jan. 10, 2003, at 6 (following Whren, Illinois police became rather diligent in stopping
motorists for minor infractions). See also People v. Staley, 778 N.E.2d 362, 363 (Ill.
App. Ct.
2002) (regarding a stop for missing registration light); People v. Rush, 745 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Il.
App. Ct. 2001) (detailing a stop for a car's tire momentarily touching the center line); People v.
Jackson, 780 N.E.2d 826, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (analyzing a stop for a car having air fresheners
materially obstructing the windshield).
28. See David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling On Our Nation's Highways,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION SPECIAL REP. (June 1999) (providing extensive statistical evidence
of racial profiling by law enforcement in traffic stops throughout the United States).
29. See, e.g., State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903 (N.J. 2002) (recognizing that because the New
Jersey Constitution provides more protection for its citizens against unreasonable searches and
seizures than the Federal Constitution, a consent to search following a routine stop for a traffic
violation must be accompanied by a reasonable articulable suspicion that the search would yield
evidence of a crime in order to ensure that searches are conducted in a non-discriminatory
mariner).
30. 782 N.E.2d 275 (111. 2002), overruled by People v. Bew, 886 N.E.2d 1002 (Il1. 2008).
31. 782 N.E.2d 260 (Ill.
2003), overruled by People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947 (Ill.
2008).
32. 796 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2003).
33. 802 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. 2003), vacated,543 U.S. 405 (2005).
34. 802 N.E.2d 219 (I11.
2003), vacated,543 U.S. 1135 (2005).
35. Cox, 782 N.E.2d at 277.
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mph zone, 36 and a defective brake light (which turned out not to be
defective). 37 And, although race and ethnic background is not always
clear from the cases, Bunch dealt with an African-American, Gonzalez
concerned a Hispanic passenger, and Caballesinvolved a driver
who, in
38
the words of his attorney, was Filipino but looked Hispanic.
The Illinois Supreme Court's response in this quintet of cases was, in
effect, to tell police:
Look, under Whren we will let you pull over minority drivers for
trivial offenses for which you would probably never pull over white
drivers. But don't even think of expanding the stop into something
more extensive. You want to waste your time handing out tickets to
African-Americans and Hispanics for having their front tire touch the
center-line? Fine, issue the citation and move on. Just don't use the
stop as a pretext for additional
tactics, such as dog sniffs and requests
39
for consent searches.

To better understand the direction the Illinois Supreme Court took in
these five cases, this Part will examine each in detail.
1. Scope of police questioning during a traffic stop: People v. Gonzalez,
People v. Harris,and People v. Bunch
John Gonzalez was a passenger in a car that was stopped for not
having a front license plate. 40 Without possessing any suspicion of
wrongdoing concerning Gonzalez, the officer asked him for
identification. 4 1 Gonzalez produced a traffic ticket in lieu of other
identification. 4 2 The officer ran a criminal history on Gonzalez and
discovered he had a long criminal record. 4 3 Gonzalez then consented to
the officer's request to search his person. 4 4 After the search recovered
cocaine, Gonzalez was arrested and charged with possession. 45 Prior to
trial, he filed a motion to suppress, contending that the police officer

36.

Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 203.

37. Bunch, 796 N.E.2d at 1026-27.
38. Michael Higgins, Court Bars Drug-Dog Use in Traffic Stops; 'Hunch' Doesn't Validate
Search, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2003, § 2, at 1.
39. Timothy P. O'Neill, 5 Reasons Defense Attorneys Should Be Thankful, CHI. DAILY L.

BULL., Dec. 12, 2003, available at http://www.jmls.edu/facultypubs/oneill/oneillcolumn
_1203.shtml.
40. People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 262 (111.2003), overruled by People v. Harris, 886
N.E.2d 947 (1I1.2008).
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

45. Id. at 262-63.
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had no basis for asking for his identification and that the cocaine should
46
be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis in the case by noting
that a traffic stop is limited by the principles of the "stop-and-frisk"
doctrine of Terry v Ohio.4 7 In determining whether the traffic stop was
reasonable, the court used the two-prong template established in Terry:

first, whether the officer's action in initiating the stop was justified at its
inception; and second, whether the officer's action during the stop was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
interference in the first place. 4 8 This "scope" inquiry depended on two

factors: the duration of the stop and the manner in which the stop is
conducted.4 9
Using this matrix, Gonzalez established that police questioning

during a traffic stop is proper if it can be justified by any one of three
reasons: first, if the question is related to the initial justification for the
stop; second, if it is not so related, if the officer nonetheless had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the question; and third, if
neither of these apply, if, in light of all the circumstances and common
sense, the question did not impermissibly prolong the detention or
50
change the fundamental nature of the stop.

Gonzalez thus imposed important restrictions on the ability of police
to turn simple traffic stops into fishing expeditions for illegal drugs and
weapons. It placed both duration and manner restrictions on police
activity during traffic stops. Accordingly, Gonzalez was a victory for
51
drivers' and passengers' rights.
The court later applied the test articulated in Gonzalez in People v.
53
Harris.52 In Harris, the police stopped a car for an illegal left turn.
46. Id. at 263.

47. Id. at 265; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 266 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
49. Id. at 268-69 (noting that historically Illinois appellate courts have chosen improperly to
address solely the temporal nature of a stop to determine whether or not it is reasonable.). The
scope of a Terry stop is necessarily limited by the manner in which a detention is carried out as
well. Id.
50. Id. at 270.

51. Ultimately, the court ruled that the police were justified in asking the passenger Gonzalez
for his identification, finding that the question did not temporally extend the stop for the missing
license plate. Id. It also found that the request did not change the "fundamental nature" of the
stop, characterizing the request as "facially innocuous." Id. However, at least one state court
would reject this conclusion. See Washington v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202 (Wash. 2004) (asking an
automobile passenger for identification without any independent basis for doing so violates the
Washington Constitution's right to privacy).
52. 802 N.E.2d 219 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005).
53. Id.at221.
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The police subsequently determined that the driver's license had been
either suspended or revoked.54 Raymond Harris was a passenger in the
car. 5 5 The officer who conducted the stop conceded that Harris's
behavior had aroused no suspicion. 56 However, the officer also testified
that in order to avoid a possible vehicle impound, his normal practice
was to determine if a passenger was legally able to drive the car by
requesting identification. 57 Despite this testimony, at no time did the
officer ask the defendant if he was able to drive the car; rather, he
merely asked for identification. 58 The officer then ran Harris's
identification card through county dispatch and discovered that Harris
had an outstanding warrant. 59 The arrest and search of Harris produced
a rock of cocaine, 60 and Harris was charged with possession. 6 1 Before
62
trial, he moved to suppress the cocaine.
The Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the police behavior against the
three-prong test it had recently established in Gonzalez.63 First, it held
that running the background check on passenger Harris's identification
bore no relation to the original reason for the stop-the driver's illegal
left turn. 64 Second, the court found that the officer had conceded that he
ran the background check on Harris without any reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing on Harris's part. 65 Third, it found that the background
check was clearly beyond the scope of the traffic stop, for even if it did
not prolong the stop temporally, it certainly transformed the nature of
the encounter from a routine citation stop into a general investigation of
the passenger's past wrongdoings. 6 6 Thus,
the court quashed Harris's
67
search.
resulting
the
of
fruits
the
and
arrest
The Illinois Supreme Court again applied the Gonzalez test in People
v. Bunch. 68 Bernard Bunch was a passenger in a car stopped because

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 222.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029-32 (11. 2003).
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the officer believed it had a malfunctioning brake light. 69 After the
driver was arrested for failure to produce a driver's license, the officer
ordered Bunch to exit the car. 70 At this point, the officer asked Bunch,
"What's your name? Where you coming from?" 7 1 The officer twice
shined a flashlight into Bunch's face and noticed a small, clear plastic
item containing a white substance in his mouth. The officer then
arrested Bunch and ordered him to spit out the item, 72 which was later
determined to contain heroin. 73 After he was charged with possession,
74
Bunch filed a motion to suppress the heroin.
In applying the Gonzalez test, the Bunch court first determined that
the questions the officer asked passenger Bunch were not related to the
purpose of the stop, i.e., the driver's operating a motor vehicle without a
license. 75 Second, the questions were not supported by a reasonable,
76
articulable suspicion of Bunch's involvement in criminal activity.
Finally, because the officer had already successfully concluded the
purpose of the stop by arresting the driver and arranging for the tow, the
questioning improperly prolonged Bunch's detention beyond the
purpose of the stop. 77 Thus, the court quashed78 Bunch's arrest,
suppressed the evidence, and reversed the conviction.
Of the quintet of Fourth Amendment cases, these three-Gonzalez,
Harris, and Bunch--dealt with the scope of police questioning during
traffic stops.
The other two-People v. Cox79 and People v.
8
0
Caballes -dealt with the use of drug-sniffing dogs during traffic
stops.
2. Use of drug-sniffing dogs during traffic stops: People v. Cox and
People v. Caballes
Illinois police have increasingly used drug-sniffing dogs during
traffic stops. In People v. Cox and People v. Caballes, the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed the issue of what circumstances would

69. Id. at 1026-27.
70. Id. at 1027.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 1027-28.
74. Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1030-31.
Id.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1032-33.
782 N.E.2d 275 (I1. 2002).
802 N.E.2d 202 (11. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
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support the use of these dogs on stopped vehicles. In Cox, defendant
Anne Cox was stopped for a faulty rear registration light. 8 ' The officer
conducting the stop immediately called for a drug-sniffing dog, even
though he admitted he had no articulable reason for believing the car
contained drugs. 82 The dog arrived fifteen minutes later while the
officer was still writing the ticket. 8 3 The dog alerted the officer to the
presence of drugs, and cannabis was eventually found. 84 Cox was
86
85
charged with possession. She filed a motion to suppress.
The Illinois Supreme Court used the United State Supreme Court's
Terry opinion as the measuring stick for the propriety of the officer's
conduct, considering whether the officer's actions were justified at the
inception and whether the officer's actions during the stop were
properly limited in time and manner. 87 Applying Terry, the Illinois
Supreme Court discovered two problems. 8 8 First, the police could not
articulate a reason why it was necessary to call for a dog. 89 The police
could point to nothing-no smell of marijuana, no suspicious behavior
on Cox's part-that would have led to a reasonable belief that the car
might contain drugs. 90 Thus, the officer improperly broadened the
"scope" of the traffic stop to include a drug investigation. 9 1 Second, the
court was concerned with the duration of the traffic stop. 92 The state
contended that the fact that the officer was still writing the ticket fifteen
minutes after the stop-at the time the dog arrived-meant that the dogsniff was justified.9 3 The court found, however, that if the officer had
acted "expeditiously," he would have been finished before the dog
arrived.9 4 Had he done so, Cox would not have been subjected9 6to the
improper search. 95 Thus, the court suppressed the drug evidence.

81. 782 N.E.2d at 277.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 278-80. Note that Cox was decided four months before the Illinois Supreme Court
established its Terry-driven test in People v Gonzalez.
88. Id. at 280.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 281.

756
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The court used a slightly different analysis in suppressing the fruits of
a drug-sniffing dog search in People v. Caballes.97 In this case, Trooper
Gillette radioed the police dispatcher that he was stopping Caballes for
driving 71 mph in a 65-mph zone. 98 Trooper Graham heard the
99
broadcast and immediately proceeded to the scene with his drug dog.
While Gillette was writing a warning ticket, Graham walked the dog
around Caballes's car.100 The dog alerted the police to the scent of
drugs, which were subsequently discovered in the trunk. 10 1
The Illinois Supreme Court suppressed the drugs by relying on the
"scope" prong of the Terry test that it had also used in Cox. 102 It held
that Graham's use of the drug-sniffing dog, without any reasonable
suspicion of the presence of drugs, improperly broadened the scope of
the traffic stop. 10 3 Even though the drug dog did not improperly
increase the time of the stop, the "scope" prong included not only
"time," but also "manner." This is true even though the dog-sniff does
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 10 4 What is
relevant is that the police could give absolutely no reason why they
shifted their interest from the speeding charge to whether the car
contained drugs. 10 5 Thus, the use of the dog meant that the police
activity impermissibly went beyond the scope of the original reason for
06
the stop. 1
These five Illinois Supreme Court cases drastically curtailed the
ability of police to turn pretextual traffic stops into fishing expeditions
for drugs and weapons. They created a wall protecting drivers and
passengers-especially members of minority groups-from police
harassment. Foolishly, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has spent
the last few years demolishing that wall.

97. 802 N.E.2d 202, 202 (111.2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
98. Id. at 203.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 203-04.
103. Id. at 204.
104. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (since dog sniff only reveals whether or
not contraband is present, it implicates no reasonable expectation of privacy and is, therefore, not
a search under the Fourth Amendment).
105. See Caballes, 802 NE.2d at 205 (noting that the mere fact that the defendant appeared
"nervous" was not enough to expand the scope of the stop; in fact, the court went on to state that
the officer's actions were nothing more than the result of a "vague hunch").
106. See id.
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B. 2005-2008: The Illinois Supreme Court Cuts Back on the Rights of
Drivers and Passengers
During the last several years, the Illinois Supreme Court has
dramatically changed course and significantly increased the power of
police during traffic stops.
1. The beginning of the end: United States Supreme Court decisions
The tide began to turn when the United States Supreme Court agreed
to review the Caballes decision in 2005.107 Recall that the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Caballes stressed that the "scope" of the
10 8
stop was cabined by two separate factors: "time" and "manner."
Even though the dog-sniff did not extend the "time" of the stop, it did
change the "manner." 10 9 Since there was no reasonable suspicion 110
the
defendant had drugs, use of the dog violated the Fourth Amendment.
In overturning Caballes, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the Illinois Supreme Court's rationale on two grounds. First, it held that
in considering the proper "scope" of a stop, "time" was the only
relevant consideration, and "manner" was irrelevant.11 1 Thus, since the
dog-sniff occurred while the officer was writing the traffic warning, the
dog-sniff did not improperly extend the duration of the stop. 112 Second,
it rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's holding that use of the dog-sniff
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by turning a traffic
violation into a drug investigation. 113 The United States Supreme Court
instead held that because the dog-sniff was not a "search"-that is, it
did not impact any reasonable expectation of privacy-its use had no
114
Fourth Amendment implications.
A few weeks later, the United States Supreme Court issued another
decision, Muehler v. Mena,115 which reiterated that "time," not
"manner," determined whether a seizure remained within the proper

107.
108.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
Caballes, 802 N.E.2d at 205.

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Caballes,543 U.S. at 408.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 408-09. The Court quickly dismissed the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion that
the use of the drug-sniffing dog materially changed the nature of the stop into a drug investigation
by holding that "conducting a dog-sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is
lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog-sniff itself

infringed respondent's constitutionally protected interest in privacy." Id.
114. Id.at409-10.
115. 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
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"scope" under the Fourth Amendment. 116 Mena was detained in a
house while the police executed a search warrant.11 7 During this
detention, the police asked her about her immigration status-an issue
wholly unrelated to the purpose of the search. 18 She subsequently filed
a section 1983119 lawsuit claiming that the police questioning violated
her Fourth Amendment rights because it went beyond the "reasonable
0
manner" prong of the "scope" requirement.12
Relying on Caballes, the Court first held that Mena was properly
seized during the execution of the search warrant and that the
questioning did not improperly prolong the seizure. 121 The Court
reaffirmed that "time," and not "manner," is the only relevant criterion
for "scope." Second, the Court held that mere police questioning did
not constitute a per se seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 12 2 Thus,
similar to the dog-sniff in Caballes that was neither a separate search
nor seizure, the Court held that as long as the questioning did not
23
actually prolong the original seizure, the police behavior was proper. 1
2. The Illinois Supreme Court follows suit
These United States Supreme Court decisions had a ripple effect on
the quintet of cases the Illinois Supreme Court decided in 2002-2003.
On remand in People v. Caballes124 ("Caballes If'), the Illinois
Supreme Court completely abandoned its earlier position and simply
"acquiesced in the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that, if a traffic stop is
proper, police action that does not unreasonably prolong the stop or
independently trigger the Fourth Amendment is permissible even if it
goes beyond the scope of the stop." 125 The Illinois Supreme Court
pointedly refused to discuss whether the United States Supreme Court's
116. Id. at 100-01 (holding that police inquiry into an individual's immigration status absent
reasonable articulable suspicion does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure unless the
duration of the detention exceeds a reasonable amount of time).
117. Id. at 95.
118. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (providing a civil action for deprivation of
rights).
120. Mena, 544 U.S. at 96-97.
121. Id. at 101.
122. Id. at 100-01.
123. Id. at 101-02.
124. 851 N.E.2d 26 (111. 2006).
125. See People v. Starnes, 871 N.E.2d 815, 819-20 (I11.2007) (describing the Caballes II
decision and citing Justice Ginsburg's dissent from Illinois v. Caballes in which she concluded
that the Court's opinion abandoned any rule that police action following a stop must be
reasonably related in scope to the justification for the stop (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405,420 (2005)).
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decision in Caballes was a wise or unwise policy; it merely held that
"limited lockstep" required it to unquestioningly follow almost
any
126
search and seizure decision of the United States Supreme Court.
Moreover, Caballes H did more than simply overrule Caballes L
Recall that Gonzalez held that police activity during a traffic stop runs
afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it either improperly prolongs the stop
or if it changes the fundamental nature of the stop. In Caballes II, the
Illinois Supreme Court-similar to the United States Supreme Court in
Caballes-simply eliminated "changing the fundamental nature of the
stop" as a relevant consideration when examining the "scope" of a
stop. 12 7 The Illinois Supreme Court thus recognized that "time" was the
only relevant factor in the "scope" inquiry. 12 8
Caballes II
"unmistakably, albeit not explicitly,"' 129 abandoned the "changing the
30
fundamental nature of the stop" prong of Gonzalez. 1
Thus, although the Illinois Supreme Court implicitly overruled the
"changing the fundamental nature of the stop" prong of Gonzalez, it
would not explicitly overrule it until March of 2008. Ironically, that
occurred as the court
was overturning another of the quintet of cases31
People v. Harris.1
The Illinois Supreme Court decided Harris I in 2003. In 2005, the
United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for
reconsideration in light of the Caballes decision. 132 On remand, the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed its ruling in HarrisL 133 Recall that in
Harris I the court found that by running a warrant check during the
traffic stop on Harris-a passenger-the officer's actions constituted a
fundamental alteration of the nature of the traffic stop. 134 Thus, based
on Gonzalez, the court held for Harris.
In Harris II, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the legal terrain
had changed. Specifically, the Harris II court noted that through its
decisions in Caballes and Muehler, the United States Supreme Court
had

126. CaballesH1,851 N.E.2d at 39-40.
127. Starnes, 871 N.E.2d at 819-20.
128. See generally Caballes11, 851 N.E.2d at 31.
129. Starnes, 871 N.E.2d at 820.
130. Id.
131. 802 N.E.2d 219 (I11.2003), vacated, Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005) [hereinafter
"Harris1'].
132. Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135 (2005).
133. People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947, 957 (111.2008) [hereinafter HarrisI].
134. 802 N.E.2d at 231.
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rejected [the] reasoning that led to this court's adoption of the
"fundamental alteration of the nature of the stop" portion of the
"scope" prong of Gonzalez. All that remains is the duration prong.
During a lawful seizure, as occurred in both Muehler and Caballes,
the police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and
are not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before doing so.135
HarrisH went on to hold that the warrant check of passenger Harris,
like the dog sniff in Caballes and the questioning in Muehler, neither
prolonged the stop nor constituted a separate search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 136 Moreover, the court found that the officer was
allowed to question Harris for the same reason the officer was allowed
to question the plaintiff in Mena. 13 7 Therefore, the court affirmed
138
Harris's conviction.
On the same day the Illinois Supreme Court decided HarrisII, it also
decided People v. Bew. 139 Bew expressly reconsidered Cox's rule that,

for a canine sniff to be valid under the Fourth Amendment, officers
must not only have "specific and articulable facts" that justify the sniff,
but the stop itself must not be prolonged by the sniff. 140 Bew held that,
based on Caballes IA it was clear that a dog sniff of a car was always
proper so long as it did not improperly prolong the stop. Thus, the
"specific and articulable" prong of Cox was overruled.
3. The state of the law today
The Illinois Supreme Court's turnaround in the area of traffic stops
has been stunning. First, Caballes I was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court and subsequently overruled by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Caballes II. Second, Harris I was overruled by the Illinois
Supreme Court in HarrisII. Third, the "articulable suspicion" prong of
Cox was overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court in Bew. Finally, the
"fundamental alteration of the nature of the stop" part of the "scope"
prong that was established in Gonzalez was overruled in Harris 11. 141
135. Harris I1, 886 N.E.2d at 960. For a recent example of a traffic stop that was found to
have been unreasonably prolonged, see People v. Bernstein, 890 N.E.2d 1225, 1231-32 (111.App.
Ct. 2008) (holding that under the circumstances a 28-minute traffic stop was unreasonable),
vacated, 896 N.E.2d 1061 (Ill. 2008).
136. HarrisII, 886 N.E.2d at 960.
137. Id. at961.
138. Id. at 964.
139. People v. Bew, 886 N.E.2d 1002 (ill. 2008).
140. Id. at 1007.
141. The Illinois Supreme Court has had no reason to reexamine its decision in People v.
Bunch. But to the extent that Bunch may have been based on the stop being improperly
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Brick by brick, the Illinois Supreme Court dismantled the impressive
edifice it erected in 2002-03.
And let's be clear about one fact: the Illinois Supreme Court did not
have to overrule any of these cases. In our federal system, the state's
highest court has every right to find that the Illinois Constitution offers
more protection to Illinois citizens than does the Fourth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court was not
obligated to adopt the United States Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment rulings in Caballes and Muehler.14 2 Instead, the court
could have found that Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution
14 3
provides increased protection to Illinois drivers and passengers.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the exact holdings of
the United States Supreme Court and employed the faux legal doctrine
of "limited lockstep" 144 as its justification for doing so. This doctrine is
an excuse for the court to do no independent thinking once the United
States Supreme Court has decided a search and seizure issue. I have
criticized the Illinois Supreme Court's use of this doctrine in an earlier

prolonged, that case may still be good law. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text
(discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's application of the Gonzalez test in deciding People v.
Bunch).
142. See People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 156 (Ill. 1984) (acknowledging that the Illinois
Supreme Court is free to interpret the state constitution differently from the Federal Constitution).
Moreover, at least one state supreme court has found that Caballes and Muehler are not even
applicable to the scope of a Terry stop. See State v. Smith, 184 P.3d 890, 902 (Kan. 2008)
(holding that the appellate court erred in relying on Mena in expanding the scope of a traffic
stop). In Smith, the Kansas Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers may not expand
the scope of a routine traffic stop to include a search that is unrelated to the purpose of the stop,
even if the defendant consents. Id. According to the court, consensual searches during a traffic
stop are unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment of the United State Constitution and
section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Id.
143. Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution provides:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other
possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
ILL. CONST. OF 1970, art. I, § 6 (1970).
144. A state supreme court uses the limited lockstep doctrine when it employs the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution to a state constitution, even
though the state supreme court could add additional protections to its constitution. Caballes I1,
851 N.E.2d 26, 31 (Ill. 2006). The Illinois Supreme Court in Caballes II declined to disturb its
tradition of following this doctrine under principles of stare decisis, and "because the limited
lockstep approach continues to reflect our understanding of the intent of the framers of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970." Id. at 44-45. As a result, the court in CaballesII held that the search and
seizure provision of the Illinois Constitution should be understood in the exact same manner that
the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 46.
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article, 14 5 and will not repeat all the arguments here. In any event, in
following the "limited lockstep" doctrine, a state court exhibits no
understanding of its role in the federal system. When the United States
Supreme Court issues a holding on the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, it is merely setting the minimum constitutional floor that
all states have to respect. By definition, it must be a "one-size-fits-all"
rule that applies to Vermont and North Dakota, as well as California and
New York. By blindly accepting a national ruling intended to work in
Vermont and North Dakota, the Illinois Supreme Court perversely
insists on buying law "off the rack." It ignores the fact that the federal
system allows Illinois to have laws tailored to fit the particular problems
in Illinois. 14 6 For example, Vermont and North Dakota may not have a
"driving while black" problem for the simple reason that they have very
few blacks. 147 Thus, the "limited lockstep" doctrine is the Illinois

Supreme Court's excuse for
not fine-tuning constitutional law to fit the
148

realities of life in Illinois.
Assuming the Illinois Supreme Court will continue to follow "limited
lockstep" in search and seizure cases, the real issue is what this now
means for Illinois drivers and passengers-especially those who are
minorities.

145. See Timothy P. O'Neill, "Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again ": The Failure of Illinois
Appellate Courts To Protect Their CriminalDecisionsfrom United States Supreme CourtReview,
36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 893, 914 (2005).
146. The U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations create a floor, not a ceiling, of
rights. A state is always free to grant more rights to its citizens, but it is not allowed to go under
the floor, i.e., grant fewer rights to its citizens through a more pro-prosecution ruling. See
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-40 (1983) (discussing whether a review of state law to
determine if state courts have utilized federal law to support their decisions establishes an
adequate and independent ground for judgment).
147. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's report issued in August of 2001, African
Americans comprised approximately 15% of the total population in Illinois as compared to 0.5%
in Vermont and 0.6% in North Dakota. JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK
POPULATION: 2000 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/c2kbrO1 -5.pdf.
148. The U.S. Supreme Court recently demolished the recurrent argument that there is a value
in states having uniform interpretations of constitutional issues in criminal law:
This interest in uniformity, however, does not outweigh the general principle that
States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their
own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The
fundamental interest in federalism that allows individual States to define crimes,
punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of
different ways-so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution-is not
otherwise limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity.
Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008).

2009]

Vagrants in Volvos

II. TRAFFIC STOPS, DOG SNIFFS, CONSENT SEARCHES, AND MINORITIES:
THE CURRENT IMPACT OF ILLINOIS LAW THROUGH A HYPOTHETICAL
CASE

The impact of the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions cannot be
underestimated. To illustrate, consider "Officer Smith," a hypothetical
police officer in an all-white Chicago suburb. Officer Smith is an
admitted racist. His personal policy is to ignore routine traffic offenses
by anyone driving a car exhibiting the all-white suburb's city sticker.
Instead, he enforces traffic laws only against out-of-town vehicles with
drivers who appear to be black or Latino.
It is important to understand that Officer Smith only stops drivers
who actually violate a traffic law. He never makes a stop that is not
based on probable cause. In order to do this, he strictly enforces all
traffic offenses committed by out-of-town drivers who appear to be
racial minorities. And to discover such offenses, he carefully follows
all such drivers traveling through the suburb with the purpose of seeing
whether they violate any such law.
Officer Smith avidly reads new Illinois cases for ideas for traffic
stops. In fact, he is keenly aware of a variety of actions that have
justified traffic stops. He was happy to see that the Illinois Supreme
Court recently validated a traffic stop based on a car stopping with its
front tires in the crosswalk. 149 He knows of two recent cases in which
traveling 71 mph in a 65-mph zone supported a traffic stop 15 0 although there is no reason why going even 1 mph over the limit would
not also qualify. He is cognizant of the burned-out-light-over-thelicense-plate offense. 15 1 He knows courts have upheld officers stopping
cars for having a tinted rear license plate cover. 15 2 Air fresheners and
153
fuzzy dice hanging from the rear view mirror can warrant a stop.
149. See People v. Bew, 886 N.E.2d 1002, 1004 (Il. 2008) (discussing the position of the
defendant's car during the traffic stop); see also People v. Wood, 883 N.E.2d 620, 622 (I11.App.
Ct. 2008) (noting that violation occurred when the front portion of the vehicle was over the stop
line at an intersection).
150. People v Roa, 879 N.E.2d 366, 367 (I11.App. Ct. 2007), vacated and remanded, 896
N.E.2d 790 (I11.2008); People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ill. 2006).
151. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ill. 2002), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Bew, 886 N.E.2d 1002 (Ill. 2008) (explaining that the defendant was stopped by police for not
having a rear registration light); cf People v. Bailey, 639 N.E.2d 1278, 1279 (Il. 1994)
(defendant's car was stopped by police for having no front license plate).
152. People v. Mendoza, 846 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that the defendant's
tinted rear license plate cover and a bandanna hanging from the rear view mirror obstructing his
view caused the traffic stop), rev 'd on other grounds by 898 N.E.2d 603 (I1l. 2008.).
153. People v. Young, 843 N.E.2d 489, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). However, not all air
fresheners are of a size that "materially obstructs" the driver's view. See People v. Johnson, 893
N.E.2d 275, 280 (111.App. Ct. 2008) (holding that an officer's belief that the presence of a
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And, if all else fails, he is likely to observe
some kind of improper lane
54
usage if he follows a car long enough. 1
To reiterate: Officer Smith never pulls over a minority driver unless
the driver has actually committed a traffic violation. However, Officer
Smith says it is rare to see a driver execute a perfect stop at an
intersection with a stop sign. And, he says with a wink, "Who needs a
vagrancy law when you have an entire traffic code?"
Does Officer Smith's racially-based law enforcement policy violate
the Fourth Amendment? No, because the United States Supreme Court
has told us that the test for a Fourth Amendment violation is purely
objective; the subjective state of mind of the officer is completely
irrelevant. 155 And even if Smith's racially-biased enforcement violates
the Equal Protection Clause, exclusion of evidence in a criminal case
15 6
may not even be a possible remedy.
To begin, assume that Officer Smith makes a legal traffic stop based
on probable cause that the driver has committed a traffic offense. First,
he can order the driver and any passengers out of the car without any
reason other than to ensure the officer's safety. 157 Second, he may
legally arrest the driver, so long as state law says it is an offense
warranting arrest. However, there is absolutely no offense so minor that
an arrest for it will be improper under the Fourth Amendment. 158 It is
"cherry" air freshener observed briefly at night was a material obstruction was not reasonable or
justifiable); see also Mendoza, 846 N.E.2d at 171 (interpreting 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-503(c)
as forbidding objects in vehicles that materially obstruct the driver's view).
154. See People v. Salinas, 891 N.E.2d 884, 887 (111.App. Ct. 2008) (defendant was pulled
over for failing to use a turn indicator to shift lanes); People v. Schaefer, 796 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (traffic stop initiated because defendant's car wheels crossed over left lane marker
by twelve inches).
155. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("We think these cases [United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978)] foreclose any
argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations
of the individual officers involved.").
156. Compare United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the
exclusionary rule is customarily applied to Fourth Amendment violations and suppression is not a
remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment), with Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 699
(Mass. 2008) (holding that suppression is allowed under the state constitution's Equal Protection
Clause).
157. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (explaining that the "de minimis"
intrusion against the driver weighed against legitimate safety concerns for officers justifies an
officer's order for a driver to get out of the car); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1997) (employing the same reasoning as Mimms to equip officers with the ability to also order
passengers out of the car). Additionally, if the officer reasonably believes that any person in the
car is armed and presently dangerous, he may frisk that person for weapons. Arizona v. Johnson,
129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009).
158. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (explaining, in regard to the
propriety of an arrest for a seatbelt violation, that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe
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even proper for the local law to give the officer discretionary, rather

than mandatory, authority to arrest citizens for even the most minor
offenses. 159 And even if Officer Smith violates local law by arresting a
driver or a passenger for an offense that local law provides is not an

offense justifying arrest, the Fourth Amendment
does not provide for
160

suppression of the resulting evidence.
Third, once the officer arrests an occupant of the vehicle, he may
make a complete search of the person. 16 1 Based solely on the arrest, he
may then make a complete search of the passenger compartment of the
car, including all containers in the passenger compartment. 162 Fourth,
once the arrestee is booked and incarcerated at the police station, the
police may conduct an inventory of his possessions. 163 After his
incarceration, the police may even take a warrantless "second-look"
16 4
search of his person if they believe they have missed something.
Finally, if the vehicle has been impounded, the police have the right to
perform a complete inventory, provided they follow the standard
16 5
procedures established in the jurisdiction.

All of this is allowable if Officer Smith decides to arrest one of the
occupants of the car. If, on the other hand, the officer merely gives a
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may,
without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender").
159. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973) (holding that arrest and subsequent
search of the petitioner for the "benign or trivial" offense of driving an automobile without a valid
license was valid).
160. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1608 (2008) ("But the arrest rules that the officers
violated were those of state law alone, and as we have just concluded, it is not the province of the
Fourth Amendment to enforce state law.").
161. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a lawful arrest
establishes the authority to fully search the person).
162. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 623 (2004) ("Once an officer determines
that there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their
safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment."); see also New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (finding the search of a jacket located inside the
passenger compartment of the car following the defendant's arrest was valid). The U.S. Supreme
Court is currently re-examining whether the arrest of the occupant of a vehicle per se should
automatically justify a complete search of the passenger compartment. Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d
640 (Ariz. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 1443 (Feb. 25, 2008) (No. 07-542).
163. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) ("At the station house, it is entirely proper
for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the possession of an
arrested person who is to be jailed.").
164. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806-08 (1974) (once in custody, further
examination of the arrestee's clothes was reasonable because probable cause linked the clothes to
the specific crime).
165. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1987) (asserting that nothing prohibits
police from exercising discretion in deciding to impound a person's vehicle when it is in
accordance with standard criteria and its basis is on something other than suspicion of criminal
activity).
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citation or a warning, his authority is a bit more limited. But with the
Illinois Supreme Court overruling its decisions in Caballes, Cox,
Harris, and Gonzalez, he has much more leeway than he did five years
ago.
The stop per se gives Officer Smith the right to order the driver and
passengers out of the car. 16 6 Further, he now has the right to use the
stop as a pretext to "fish" for additional information. He can ask
questions of the driver and the passengers completely unrelated to the
stop, even without any reasonable suspicion; this may include questions
about drugs, weapons, and contraband. 167 He can run warrant checks
on the driver and passengers without any reasonable suspicion. 16 8 He
can perform dog-sniff inspections of the vehicle without any reasonable
suspicion. 16 9 He can ask consent to search the driver, passengers, and
vehicle without any reasonable suspicion. The only constraint on the
officer's activity is "time." As long as the officer's actions take place
while he is properly preparing the warning or citation, all of this activity
is proper in Illinois.
Clearly, all of this is troubling. But it is even more troubling to see
how these tactics are actually used by Illinois police officers. The next
Part will examine a recent case that illustrates the problematic manner
in which officers are applying these rules on Illinois highways.
III. THE ANATOMY OF A PRETEXTUAL STOP: PEOPLEV. RoA
The hypothetical discussed in the previous Part is actually quite
realistic. This Part will discuss a recent case decided by the Third
District Appellate Court involving a traffic stop: People v. Roa.170 The
facts are common to many Illinois cases: a traffic stop for a minor
166. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
414-15 (1997).
167. HarrisH, 886 N.E.2d 947, 960 (Il. 2008) ("During a lawful seizure, as occurred in both
Muehler and Caballes, the police may ask questions unrelated to the original detention and are
not required to form an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before doing so.").
168. Id. at957-58.
169. People v. Bew, 886 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Il. 2008).
170. 879 N.E.2d 366 (Il1. App. Ct. 2007), vacated and remanded, 896 N.E.2d 790 (Il. 2008).
On November 26, 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for leave to
appeal, but vacated and remanded the case to the Third District. The Illinois Supreme Court
directed the Third District to reconsider its decision in light its recent decision in People v. Cosby,
898 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. 2008). Cosby dealt with the issue of whether, once a traffic stop ends, an
officer's subsequent request to search a vehicle constitutes a new seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. 898 N.E.2d at 612. The Roa case is currently under consideration in the Third
District. Regardless of the Third District's eventual decision, the majority and dissenting
opinions of the vacated decision that are discussed in this Article continue to offer valuable
insights into pretextual stops in Illinois.
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offense; the driver allegedly consents to a search of the vehicle; drugs
are found. The majority in Roa held that the officer's questioning and
request for consent to search the defendant's vehicle following the
conclusion of a traffic stop were legal. 17 1 What is different about this
case, however, is a dissenting opinion that dares to look beyond the
surface of the case to reveal what is really involved: a pretextual traffic
stop made for the purpose of conducting a drug investigation without
either probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 172 After discussing the
dissenting opinion, this Part will then turn to recent empirical evidence
showing how pretextual stops disparately impact minority drivers and
passengers in Illinois.
A.

The Danger of CurtailingConstitutionalProtectionsin Pretextual
Traffic Stops: The Dissent in People v. Roa

In Roa, Andres Roa was pulled over for speeding on 1-80 by Sgt.
Floyd Blanks. 17 3 Blanks told him that he was going to issue a written
warning. 174 Blanks then returned to his squad car, ostensibly to prepare
the warning. 175 When he returned and gave Roa the warning, Blanks
asked several questions before asking Roa for permission to search the
car. Roa agreed. 176 Another officer soon arrived on the scene, and he
-and Blanks proceeded to conduct a twenty-minute search. 17 7 With the
use of a fiber-optic scope, the officers discovered twenty-four pounds of
cocaine hidden in the car. 17 8 Roa was subsequently convicted and
sentenced to fifteen years in the penitentiary. 179 The Third District
180
Appellate Court affirmed, finding the search legally proper.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

879 N.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 378-79 (McDade, J., dissenting).
Id. at 367 (majority opinion).
Id. at368.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

179. Id. at 369-70.
180. Two justices agreed that the search was proper, but each arrived at this conclusion
through a different route. Justice Wright held that the conversation between Blanks and Roa after
the issuance of the written warning constituted a second seizure which needed to be
independently justified. Id. at 373. She held that it was so justified, pointing to Roa's nervous

behavior and the strong odor of air freshener during Blanks' first confrontation with Roa. Id. at
374. She went on to find that Roa voluntarily consented to the search. Id. at 376. Justice Lytton,
specially concurring, did not agree that Blanks' second conversation constituted a second seizure.
Id. at 377 (Lytton, J., concurring). Other than this, he agreed with Justice Wright's reasoning and

conclusion. Id.
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On the surface, Roa looks no different from dozens of other traffic
stop cases: officer stops driver, driver "voluntarily consents" to show
officer his contraband drugs, and driver gets fifteen years in Stateville.
While a layperson might well find this story implausible, it is a tale that
the American judicial system buys thousands of times a year.
What makes Roa so interesting is not the run-of-the-mill decision
affirming the validity of the search, but rather the insightful dissent of
Justice Mary McDade. 18 1 Justice McDade actually had the audacity to
suggest that the emperor may be lacking some clothes.
182
First, she noted that this was no ordinary traffic stop for speeding.
The defendant was clocked at 71 mph in a 65-mph zone. 18 3 Justice
McDade chided her colleagues for refusing to concede the obvious:
"Blanks did not stop Andres Roa for driving six miles over the speed
limit because he wanted to keep the highway safe for other motorists.
The fact is that he is a drug interdiction officer and as such he cruises
the interstate trolling for drug offenders." 184 In fact, at the suppression
hearing Blanks admitted that he had made around 3,000 drug
interdiction stops in his seventeen-year career. 18 5 Justice McDade thus
argued that this so-called traffic stop "was nothing more than subterfuge
186
from the outset."
Justice McDade conceded, of course, that pretextual stops do not
violate the Fourth Amendment. 187 But her point was far subtler. She
contended that an officer making a bona fide traffic stop will see things
differently from an officer who is conducting a drug interdiction stop on
the pretext of a traffic violation. 18 8 Thus, "[f]or an officer already
convinced that he is dealing with a drug courier, objectively innocent
behavior morphs into indicators of criminal behavior: nervousness and
fumbling can easily become 'extreme' or 'excessive,' a simple air
freshener becomes a masking agent and magically provides reasonable
articulate suspicion of drug dealing."' 189 In other words, the officer's

181. Id. at 378 (McDade, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 378.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 379.
185. Id. at 382.
186. Id. at 379.
187. Id. ("Technically even one mile per hour over the speed limit constitutes the requisite
probable cause.").
188. Id. (noting that in the latter case the officer is "viewing the defendant and the vehicle
with the purpose of finding an excuse to search and of vindicating his original belief that the
driver is a drug courier").
189. Id.
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mindset automatically casts a "sinister patina" over his ordinary
190
observations.
This led Justice McDade to a troubling fact that many judges simply
refuse to confront. Specifically, because Fourth Amendment law is
mostly developed through cases reviewing suppression motions and the
possible use of the exclusionary rule, the police in these cases never
come up empty-handed. By definition, the police have had to either be
correct, or at least lucky, in every single review of a suppression
hearing.
This simple, but often-overlooked, fact has serious implications. The
majority in Roa correctly pointed out that the United States Supreme
Court has held that reviewing courts owe deference to the experience
and specialized training of police officers when evaluating whether an
officer's observations result in reasonable suspicion. 19 1 Yet Justice
McDade reminds us that, by definition, reviewing courts are only able
to apply this presumption in cases where the police have actually found
incriminating evidence. 192 Thus, the universe of cases in which the
presumption is used is automatically rigged in favor of the police.
McDade continued:
As judges, we get a false sense of the reliability ... [of the indicators
police] use in profiling drivers. The only time these stops come to our
attention is when contraband is actually found during a search of the
vehicle. It tends to appear, therefore, that the9 3 law enforcement
officers are right one hundred percent of the time. 1
McDade conceded that Blanks testified that as a drug interdiction
19 4
officer he had probably made 1000 successful interdiction stops.
However, she pointed out that Blanks admitted he had probably made
2000 unsuccessful stops. 19 5 Yet judges reviewing suppression motions
96
never see those 2000 stops where the police come up empty-handed. 1

190. Id.
191. Id. at 375 (majority opinion) (the totality-of-the-circumstances approach "allows officers
to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person'
(citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). The majority also cited to United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), for a similar proposition: "[t]he inquiry for the trial
court was whether this officer, not just any officer, had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the
second seizure." Id.
192. Roa, 879 N.E.2d at 382 (McDade, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 382-83.
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Finally, McDade questioned whether Roa actually consented to the
scope of the extensive search carried out. 197 She found insufficient
evidence that Roa had consented to the search of the entire car, rather
than just the trunk. 198 Yet, even if he consented to the search of the
"car," she argued that a reasonable motorist would believe that this
merely entailed the officers looking at the seats and floor of the car, and
perhaps in the glove compartment. 199 Instead, the officers in question
conducted a twenty-minute search with a fiber-optic scope that resulted
in "the virtual dismantling of the vehicle on the side of the highway." 20 0
A reasonable person, McDade noted, would not have believed such a
20 1
search could be made without a warrant.
Roa is a textbook example of a pretextual traffic stop. Clearly,
Sergeant Blanks was not interested in the fact that Roa was driving six
miles per hour over the speed limit.20 2 Indeed, Blanks would not have
20 3
stopped Roa unless he had a hunch that Roa was carrying drugs.
Why Roa? We can only speculate about his possible ethnicity. But we
do know that Blanks' job was to look for drugs. 204 This is what is so
dangerous about pretextual stops: once the stop is made, there is a
strong tendency that the officer will view everything through a lens that
20 5
assumes drugs are present.
B. Beyond Roa: Studies of Racial Bias in Illinois Traffic Stops
The Roa case is not an anomaly. In fact, recent studies indicate a
regular practice of pretextually stopping minority drivers in order to
have them "voluntarily" consent to a search of the vehicle. Five years
ago, the Illinois legislature mandated a study to identify racial bias in
traffic stops. 20 6 Law enforcement agencies are required to keep details
of traffic stops, including the race of the driver. 20 7 The Northwestern
197. Id.at 385-86.

198. Id. at 385. The scope of a consensual search is cabined by what a reasonable person
would have expected the search to entail. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
199. Roa, 879 N.E.2d at 386 (McDade, J.,
dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 379.
203. Id. at 375-76 (majority opinion).

204. Id. at 367.
205. Id. at 378-79 (McDade, J.,
dissenting).
206. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-212 (2007).

207. Id The statute provides:
(a) Whenever a State or local law enforcement officer issues a uniform traffic citation
or warning citation for an alleged violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code [625 ILCS 5/1100 et seq.], he or she shall record at least the following:
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University Center for Public Safety, in conjunction with the Illinois
Department of Transportation, has issued four yearly reports, with its
most recent report analyzing statistics from 2007.2o8
In 2007, police officers from more than 939 law enforcement
agencies in Illinois requested 26,765 consent searches of motor
vehicles. 20 9 Consent was granted in 24,312 cases (or 91% of the
time). 2 10 The rate of consent showed almost no difference between the
five ethnic groups studied--Caucasian, African-American, American
Each group consented to vehicle searches
Indian, Hispanic, and Asian.
2 11
around 91% of the time.
Of those who consented, police actually went on to search the vehicle
in 23,395 cases. 2 12 The report notes that, "As in past years, in 2007
consent searches were conducted disproportionately by race." 2 13 In
2007, a Hispanic driver was 2.4 times more likely to be the subject of a
consensual vehicle search than a Caucasian driver, and an AfricanAmerican driver was about three times as likely to undergo such a
search.214
Even more troubling are the results of the searches. The study
calculated the "hit rate" (the likelihood that a consent search resulted in
the seizure of contraband) on Caucasian drivers as 24.56%, while it was
(1) the name, address, gender, and the officer's subjective determination of the race of
the person stopped; the person's race shall be selected from the following list:
Caucasian, African-American, Hispanic, Native American/Alaska Native, or
Asian/Pacific Islander ....
Id. at (a)(l).
208. See NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, ILLINOIS TRAFFIC
STOPS STATISTICS STUDY: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT (2007), http://www.dot.il.gov/travelstats/
2007%20llinois%2OTraffic%20Stops%20Statistics%20Study%2Final%2Report.pdf.
Originally, the project's data collection was scheduled to end on December 31, 2007. Id. at 2.
However, Illinois Public Act 094-0997, effective January 1, 2008, not only extended the
collection time, but also asked the new Racial Profiling Prevention and Data Oversight Board to
evaluate the necessity of mandatory data collection. Id. at 2. Its recommendation is due no later
than January 2010. Id. at 2. See also Illinois General Assembly Legislation and Laws, Pub. Act
094-0997 (extending the scope of the Illinois Traffic Stops Statistics Study), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=094-0997.
209. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 208, at 4, 10.
The report compiled data on 2,450,986 traffic stops conducted by 939 law enforcement agencies.
Id. at4.
210. Id. at 10.
211. Id.
212. Id. This number constitutes less than one percent of all traffic stops made in Illinois in
2007. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. In Chicago in 2007, minority drivers were about five times more likely than
Caucasians to undergo consent searches. Monique Garcia & Darnell Little, Profiling 'Consent
Searches,' CHIC. TRIB., July 27, 2008, § 4, at 1.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

only 12.93% for minority drivers. 2 15 The conclusion is stark: although
minority drivers were about 2.5 times more likely to be the subject of a
consent search, they were only half as likely to have contraband in their
2 16
vehicles.
Another way to relate race to the "hit rate" is to consider "conditional
probability." 2 17 This is calculated by dividing the probability of finding
contraband by the probability of being consent-searched.2 1 8
For
Caucasian drivers, the conditional probability of finding contraband,
given the probability of being searched, is 41%.219 For minority
drivers, the conditional probability is 8%.220 As the report concludes,
"[p]olice officers conducting consent searches are far more likely to find
contraband1 in a vehicle driven by a Caucasian driver than by a minority
22
driver."
The numbers are even starker when only the traffic stops made by the
Illinois State Police are considered. African-American and Hispanic
drivers are three times more likely than Caucasians to be the object of
consent searches performed by the Illinois State Police. Yet the Illinois
State Police's "hit rate" on Caucasian drivers is almost twice that of
22 2
African-American drivers, and eight times that of Hispanic drivers.
The empirical evidence shows that the issue is not whether Illinois
has a problem with pretextual stops; the issue is what can be done to
remedy the situation. The next Part discusses possible approaches.
IV. TWO PROPOSED REMEDIES
One thing is clear: a solution to the problem cannot be found in the
Illinois Supreme Court. As discussed in Part I, the court's fixation on
"limited lockstep" in the area of search and seizure has resulted in the
dismantling of its sophisticated case law from 2002-2003 that
effectively curbed police "fishing expeditions" during routine traffic
stops. 223 From now on, as long as the court's search and seizure rulings
refuse to deviate from the United States Supreme Court's "one-size-fits215. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 208208, at 11.
216. Id. at 10-11.
217. Id. at 12.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. American Civil Liberties Union, Consent Searches - Illinois State Police,
http://www.aclu-il.org/news/ConsentSearches-2007-ISP.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
223. See supra Part I (discussing the change in curbing pretextual traffic stops and consensual
vehicle searches in the Illinois Supreme Court from 2002-2008).
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all-states" Fourth Amendment decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court will
continue to be part of the problem rather than the solution.
Nevertheless, there are two areas of Illinois traffic stop law that can
be improved. First, the Illinois legislature should amend the Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure by codifying rules of behavior for police
conducting routine traffic stops. Second, either the legislature or the
governor should abolish the use of consent searches during traffic stops.
A. Solution 1: Ask the Legislature to Codify the Gonzalez Test
The precedent for this solution is found in the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure's codification of Terry v. Ohio.224 Section 107-14
essentially turned the Terry decision into a statute in 1968.225 In fact, it
became law just months after the United States Supreme Court decided
22 6
Terry.
Codifying the Gonzalez test-including its now-overruled provision
forbidding the police to change the fundamental nature of the stop
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion-would go a long way
towards limiting police abuses during traffic stops. As discussed in Part
I, the Illinois Supreme Court in Gonzalez created a three-part test for
evaluating the legality of police behavior during a traffic stop. 227 When
evaluating the legality of police tactics during a stop (e.g., asking for
identification, questioning the driver and passengers, running
background checks of passengers), Gonzalez held that the behavior is
proper only if it can be justified by any one of three reasons: first, if the
question is related to the initial justification for the stop; second, if it is
not so related, if the officer nonetheless had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify the question; third, if neither of these apply, if, in the
light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question did not

224. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
225. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14. The statute provides:
Temporary questioning without arrest. A peace officer, after having identified himself
as a peace officer, may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of
time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is
committing, is about to commit or has committed an offense as defined in Section 10215 of this Code [725 ILCS 5/102-15], and may demand the name and address of the
person and an explanation of his actions. Such detention and temporary questioning
will be conducted in the vicinity of where the person was stopped.
Id.
226. Terry was decided on June 10, 1968. Terry, 392 U.S. at 1. The Illinois statute became
effective on August 21, 1968. 725 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/107-14.
227. People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260 (Ill.
2003), overruled by People v. Harris, 886
N.E.2d 947 (IIl. 2008).
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impermissibly prolong the detention or change the fundamental nature
22 8
of the stop.
The problem is that the Illinois Supreme Court overruled the most
significant part of the test. In Harris 11,229 the court held that the
"fundamental nature of the stop" prong was no longer a relevant
consideration in deciding whether the police behavior went beyond the
scope of the stop. 230 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Caballes and Mena, the court held that the only relevant
factor is the "time" factor (i.e., whether the police behavior
impermissibly prolonged the duration of the stop). 23 1 This now frees the
police to use traffic violations as a pretext to do background checks of
the driver and passenger, use a drug-sniffing dog, or ask consent for a
vehicle search based on absolutely no reasonable suspicion-as long as
the activity is confined to the actual time needed to prepare a warning or
ticket.
The codification of the unwisely-discarded test in Gonzalez would go
a long way towards curbing police fishing expeditions during traffic
stops of minority drivers in Illinois.
B. Solution 2: Abolish Consent Searches
The second reform should be to abolish consent searches of motor
vehicles during routine traffic stops in Illinois. Several years ago this
would have been considered a radical idea. 232 However, recently a
coalition of seven Illinois groups joined in a letter to the governor
asking him to order the Illinois State Police to refrain from requesting
and performing consent searches of vehicles during routine traffic
stops. 23 3 Presenting the data on consent searches discussed in Part III,
the letter stated: "[T]he conclusion is obvious--consent searches are an

228. Id.at 270.
229. People v. Harris, 886 N.E.2d 947 (Ill.
2008).
230. Id. at 961.
231. Id. at960-61.
232. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III,
Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent
Searches, 73 MISS. L.J. 525, 526-27 (2003) (urging the abolition of consent searches except in
cases of public safety).
233. Letter from American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois et al., to Rod R. Blagojevich,
Governor of Illinois (July 24, 2008), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/news/
LettertoGovernor-7-08.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Rod R. Blagojevich]. The letter was signed
by the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, Council on American-Islamic Relations: Chicago Chapter, Illinois Coalition for
Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People: Illinois Conference, and Rainbow/PUSH
Coalition. Id.
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invidious device that is a condition of inequality imposed on minority
citizens on our roadways." 2 34 It then asked the governor to order
the
23 5
Illinois State Police to stop performing vehicle consent searches.
Of course, some may raise an objection to this idea. As seen in Part
11's discussion of statistics on traffic stops made in Illinois in 2007,
approximately ninety-one percent of all drivers consented to requests
for vehicle searches. 236 Interestingly, this percentage was fairly
uniform throughout all five ethnic groups studied. If the vast majority
of drivers agree to vehicle searches, is there really a problem? To
answer that question, we must consider whether or not any of these
people are actually "consenting" in the way we normally use that term.
First, let's look at some history. The traditional standard for waiving
a constitutional right in a courtroom is that the waiver must be
2 37 This test is two-pronged. 23 8
voluntary, intelligent, and knowing.
The "voluntary" prong is concerned primarily with an objective analysis
of the behavior of the government agents involved; some objectively
bad state action is the threshold requirement for finding
"involuntariness." 239 On the other hand, the "knowing and intelligent"
prong is concerned with whether a person subjectively understands the
right that he is giving up. Watching a judge take a guilty plea provides
a good example of how to guarantee that a defendant is "intelligently
and knowingly" giving up the trial rights he possesses: the judge first
explains the rights, then inquires if the defendant understands, and
finally asks if the defendant is willing to give up these rights. Similarly,
this standard is also used when a suspect waives Miranda rights and
agrees to be interrogated by the police.
Seven years after Miranda, the United States Supreme Court was
asked to take the "voluntary, intelligent, and knowing" standard "to the
streets." The Court was asked to hold that a person could consent to a
police request for a search only if the consent was "voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing" (i.e., that the police officer actually told the
person that he had the right to say "no"). 2 40 The Burger Court refused
to extend citizens this protection. 24 1 Instead, it held in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte that the validity of consent should be measured by the same
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See Letter to Rod R. Blagojevich, supra note 233.
Id.
See text accompanying note 211.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-69 (1938) (waiver of right to counsel).
Id.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
Id. at 248.
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standard used to evaluate the admissibility of confessions under the Due
Process Clause: simple voluntariness. 24 2 Thus, police did not have to
make sure the person knew he had a right to refuse. 243 Accordingly, the
touchstone of the voluntariness test is merely the absence of police
coercion. The result is that in the thirty-five years since the Bustamonte
decision, the United States Supreme Court has never found consent to a
244
search to be involuntary.
Professor Ric Simmons has tried to explain this. 24 5 He notes that the
very idea of a person who is carrying contraband somehow agreeing to
a police search is ludicrous. 246 To characterize the searched person's
response as "voluntary" is, according to Simmons, "absurd,
meaningless, and irrelevant under traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." 24 7 The "voluntariness" test traditionally included both
objective and subjective considerations. 24 8 Yet despite giving lipservice to subjective characteristics of the defendant, Simmons argues
that the United States Supreme Court has actually come to view the
"voluntariness" of consent through a purely objective lens. 249 The
250
Court focuses almost solely on the police behavior.
Thus, what the court calls a "voluntariness" test has morphed into a
purely objective "reasonableness" test. In other words, we all realize
that no one "voluntarily" consents to a police search; the issue is rather

242.
243.
244.
consent

Id.
Id. at 249.
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding that bus passengers'
to a search of luggage and person absent suspicion was voluntary under the totality of the

circumstances where officer asked if they objected).
245. See Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Search Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 775-76 (2005) (proposing a new
three-characteristic paradigm for the Court to adopt in regards to consent searches).
246. Id. at 774.
247. Id.

248. Id. at 777. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that subjective factors such as a
defendant's level of education, intelligence, or the presence of warnings were relevant to the

totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a confession is voluntary). The
Schneckloth Court even listed Supreme Court confession cases in which subjective factors were
considered, including Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562, 567 (1958) (noting the low
education level of accused); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196 (1957) (describing the accused

as having "low mentality, if not mentally ill"); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948)
(considering the young age of the accused).

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 n.37.

249. See Simmons, supra note 245, at 775 (noting that although the subjective element of the
test still remains law on paper, Drayton marked the Supreme Court's departure from considering

subjective factors in favor of focusing solely on the objective behavior of law enforcement to
determine if a confession is compelled).
250. Id.
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whether the police acted reasonably. The "voluntary" quality of the
consent is chimerical.
There is also another problem. Although we speak of people
"consenting" to a "request," it is oxymoronic to speak of "consenting"
to a "command."
Lawrence Solan and Peter Tiersma-two law
professors who are also linguists-have recently raised the issue of
whether police conducting traffic stops are actually making "requests"
for consent, or whether something else is occurring. 2 5 1 Solan and
Tiersma took a close look at the facts of the Schneckloth case.2 52 One
might assume that the police officer simply asked, "May I search your
car?" Instead, what the officer actually said was, "Does the trunk
open?" When he was told, "Yes," the officer took the keys, opened the
trunk, and found incriminating evidence. 253 The Supreme Court held
this to be a proper "consent" to a "request" to search.2 5 4
Solan and Tiersma note that "Does the trunk open?" is not literally a
request for permission to search. 25 5 We might consider it a request
because we interpret language contextually. 256
Indeed, we hear
language not only in its literal meaning, but also in light of its
"surrounding circumstances and shared background information and
25 7
assumptions."
So why didn't the officer simply say, "May I search your trunk?"
Because all of us-including the police-often speak indirectly. As
Solan and Tiersma note, "The reason we tend to issue requests,
commands, and orders indirectly is that it is usually considered bad
258
form to make a blunt order, even if we have the authority to do so."
However, consider again the "request" in Schneckloth: "Does the trunk
open?" Would any sane person involved in a traffic stop at 2:40 a.m.
really believe this was a mere "request" from the police officer that he
could freely and voluntarily refuse?
Now consider the fact that ninety-one percent of Illinois drivers
ostensibly "consented" to searches in 2007.259 In light of Schneckloth's
holding that police need not tell drivers they have the right to refuse, it
251. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (2005).
252. Id. at 36-46.

253. Id. at 36.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973).
SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 251, at 38.
Id. at 24.
Id.

258. Id. at 39.
259. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 208, at 10.
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seems less remarkable that ninety-one percent of Illinois drivers in 2007
"consented" to police "requests" to search.2 60 Moreover, in light of the
disproportionate number of minority drivers asked to consent to
searches in Illinois, the consent search doctrine
has understandably been
26 1
labeled "the handmaiden of racial profiling."
This is why some states have in various ways curbed consent

searches. 262 As mentioned above, seven groups in Illinois-including
the ACLU of Illinois, the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, and the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund-recently asked the
governor to order the Illinois State Police to stop making consent
searches of vehicles. 2 63 This sentiment has even spread to the
mainstream media. Calling consent searches a "fool's errand," Steve
2 64
Chapman in the Chicago Tribune recently called for its abolition.
Examining the statistics in the 2007 Illinois study, Chapman noted that
"[f]ully 94% of the time, [the Illinois State Police] discover nothing
illegal-meaning they inconvenience and humiliate 16 innocent people
265
for every guilty one they turn up."

Thus, there are three possible ways to restrict consent searches. First
would be a statute in the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure abolishing
the use of consent searches of vehicles and the use of their fruits at trial.
Alternatively, the governor could accede to the request to at least stop
the Illinois State Police from executing consent searches. And finally, at
the very least, the codification of the Gonzalez rule would prevent
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police from engaging in consent searches without first having
reasonable suspicion that the car indeed contained contraband.
There is a good reason why George Thomas claims that "[c]onsent is
an acid that has eaten away the Fourth Amendment." 26 6 Since the
Illinois Supreme Court refuses to act, it is time for either the governor
or the legislature to fill the void.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since 2002, Illinois has actually gone backwards in restricting
pretextual stops of minority motorists. The Illinois Supreme Court has
explicitly overruled four cases decided in 2002 and 2003 that had wisely
restricted police power to turn routine traffic stops into fishing
expeditions for contraband. Both the executive and legislative branches
in Illinois must respond to this vacuum created by the Illinois Supreme
Court. They must recognize the pernicious impact of pretextual traffic
stops on minorities; they must limit the power of police during these
stops; and they must abolish consent searches of vehicles.
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